Ideas of Human Excellence... by Thomas E. Hill Jr.

   In Ideas of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments, Thomas E. Hill Jr. argues that in conserving nature, it is irrelevant to focus on its "rights" or "values." He says it is more important to focus on the character of the person who is indifferent toward nature. According to him, such an examination is likely to reveal the absence of certain basic qualities necessary for human excellence and essential in the proper appreciation of not only sentient beings but also non-sentient beings of nature.

   The above approach to environmental ethics stems from the branch of "Virtue Ethics." The fundamental concern of ethics is the search for universal principles of behavior, rules that guide individuals into doing what is right. While utilitarianism is concerned with the consequences of one's actions, deontology prescribes and encourages adherence to ethical rules that respect the dignity and moral rights of all persons. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, insists that the essential question to ask is not "what shall I do?" or "how shall I act?" But "what kind of person should I be?" To the virtue philosopher, the latter question, rather than tell us what to do or set a number of rules for us to follow, urges us to strive toward excellence by acting in ways that would improve and refine our characters as moral agents.

   In other words, virtue ethics seems to suggest that to ascertain if an individual is good or bad, we need only to concentrate on his actions. This view is more in tune with the cliché, "action speaks louder..." because it assumes one's character and action to be the central focal point of analysis. Everything else matters not. A critique of this view would be offered at the end of this essay.

   Hill holds that sometimes one can be immoral without doing an immoral act. In his view, a given act may be neither good nor bad but yet reveal the absence of some good qualities necessary for the actor to be a moral agent. For instance, if an individual were to spit on his grandmother's grave, nothing in his action attests to the action's goodness or badness. Our moral uneasiness about the action, however, is likely to shape our perception of the person in question, rather than reinforce any moral conviction. There is nothing bad about spitting on graves, but it is not something people would normally do. So a reflection on the character of the person, rather than the act, is vital in helping us appreciate the quality of the act. This kind of reflection, Hill believes, can help us understand why some individuals may be indifferent to non-sentient beings of nature.

   Hill's argument is simple: those indifferent and destructive toward non-sentient nature do so because they lack some basic human qualities. These essential qualities - ignorance, self- importance, and a lack of self-acceptance - are often indicative of human excellence, and those who appreciate non-sentient nature normally possess them. Therefore, Hill considers them a precondition for developing true respect for nature. His proposition is worthy of further evaluation.

   First, Hill claims that those indifferent toward nature are ignorant of humans' place in the ecosystem. Humans, he said are but a "speck on the cosmic scene." Thus a profound understanding of the intricacies of nature and the close similarities we share with other living things - including non-sentient beings - will lead us to treat them with respect. This prompts him to ask, "Could one who have a broad ... understanding of his place in nature really be indifferent to the destruction of the natural environment?" In reply, he insists that “nature-haters” are not necessarily ignorant of particular information. Their ignorance is one that springs from their inability to reflect on the broader perspective of the natural environment as a whole.

   Another reason adduced by Hill to explain the indifference of some to non-sentient beings is self-importance. By self-importance Hill refers to any objectionable attitude which selfishly ascribes importance to organisms based only on what matters to humans. For instance, some people assume plants should not be accorded any moral consideration because they lack the ability to feel, that is, they are non-sentient beings. This attitude may arise largely from the fact that those people consider the ability to feel very important because it is an important attribute possessed by humans. Hill holds that if someone, in spite of understanding his place in nature, holds that the only things important in nature are sentient beings, then that person is just "like a racist who, aware of other races, treats all races but his own as insignificant." That person would undoubtedly be living in denial, but that denial would not change the fact that the race he is excluding is just as important as the others.

   Finally, Hill explains that the destruction of, and indifference to, non-sentient beings could be deeply rooted in the lack of self-acceptance. This lack stems from the failure of one to "accept oneself when the patterns of behavior and emotion are rooted in a desire to disown and deny features of oneself, to pretend to oneself that they are not there." This situation, Hill reminds us, results when we fail to recognize that we are part of nature by our unwillingness to accept that we share many of the needs, limits, and liabilities of both sentient and non-sentient beings of nature. By accepting our affinities with "lower" living creatures, we show our humble side. If we are humble, we would refrain from "replacing the natural environment with artificial ones."

   But does Hill succeed in making his case for the preservation of nature through human excellence? My answer to this question is no. There is hardly any correlation between one's character and one's actions. The fact that I consider non-sentient beings less important does not explain why I have to cut down an oak to make a house for myself. One's needs, rather than some character trait, are likely to say more about one's actions. It is not enough to show that the individual lacks certain "fundamental" qualities of human excellence. More is required to prove that he is indifferent primarily because he lacks those qualities, whatever those qualities may be.

   There is also the problem of cognitive dissonance. This psychological dilemma sometimes forces us to act in ways quite contrary to our belief systems or principles. Most of what we do or say may be borne out of necessity rather than the presence or lack of certain character traits. Therefore, ignorance, lack of self-acceptance, and self-importance do not explain why we do what we do. Additionally, before resolving whether a particular behavior is good or bad, we must first decide what makes that behavior good or bad. This is one issue virtue ethics has a hard time addressing. Why is it vital that I recognize the importance of non-sentient beings? What is wrong in destroying the natural environment anyway?

  Unfortunately, these are questions Hill himself fails to answer. Certainly, Hill's argument that indifference to nature is the result of a derogation of human excellence is rather weak.